Grenfell Tower fire blamed on deregulation-obsessed government and dishonest companies

Dishonest cladding manufacturers and government institutions more focused on cost-cutting than upholding safety standards have been blamed on the 2017 Grenfell Tower Fire.

Incompetent and weak regulators were also panned, as well as careless architects and other contractors, in addition to the London Fire Brigade.

The fire led to the “avoidable” deaths of 72 residents, whose ages ranged from six months to 84.

The inquiry has taken six years to produce and convened more than 300 public hearings and examined about 1,600 witness statements.

Government failures:

The report pointed to a “culmination of decades of failure” by the likes of ex-PM David Cameron’s Conservative Party, largely due to a focus on deregulation and cost-cutting.

It said:

“The government’s deregulatory agenda, enthusiastically supported by some junior ministers and the secretary of state, dominated the department’s thinking to such an extent that even matters affecting the safety of life were ignored, delayed or disregarded.”

Not that the former Labour governments were blameless, as major fire safety warnings happened while the party was in office.

The then-Labour government had a chance to respond to the “striking results” of a major test involving flammable cladding as far back as 2001, but failed to communicate the dangers to the industry.

Meanwhile the response to a 2009 blaze at Lakanal House, a high-rise block in South London, was delayed or ignored, with guidance on the construction of external walls remaining unchanged.

Kensington & Chelsea:

The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea was blamed for failing to scrutinise the design or choice of materials, as well as ensuring the work complied with building requirements.

The report said:

“It [the local authority] therefore bears considerable responsibility for the dangerous conditions of the building immediately on the completion of the work.”

The response from the borough, as well as the central government, was slammed for being “muddled, slow, indecisive and piecemeal”, as many victims were left feeling abandoned by authorities, instead relying on help from volunteers.

Dishonest manufacturers:

The report said the manufacturers of the cladding engaged in “systematic dishonesty” by manipulating safety tests and misrepresenting the results.

It gave a scathing review of Arconic, an American aluminium-maker formerly known as Alcoa, saying the company “deliberately concealed from the market the true extent of the danger” of using the material in a high-rise structure. Arconic has denied concealing information or misleading any certification body, customer or the public.

Celotex, another company that made foam insulation, also “embarked on a dishonest scheme to mislead its customers and the wider market”, the report said. Meanwhile Kingspan was criticised for selling insulation unsuitable for external use in high-rise buildings.

The cladding was covered in aluminium and polyethylene cladding, a layer of foam insulation topped by two sheets of aluminium surrounded by a layer of polyethylene, a combustible plastic polymer which melts and drips on exposure to heat.

Scattered regulation:

The report criticised the different regulators involved in the construction industry, saying they should be replaced by a single independent regulator.

The National House Building Council came under fire for failing to ensure its building control function was “free of commercial pressures”.

A new regulator could oversee construction products, building control, carry out research, as well as share best practice, the inquiry said.

The report said:

“The establishment of such a regulator would bring a number of benefits, not least a focal point in driving a much-needed change in the culture of the construction industry.

“Sharing best practice across the industry must be a priority for the new regulator.

“It would enable information to be shared effectively between those responsible for different aspects of the industry and promote the exchange of ideas.

“Information on developments in the industry, both in this country and abroad, could be shared more easily.”

Building inspectors:

As it stands building inspectors can be employed by councils or privately compete for work.

The inquiry recommended setting up an independent panel to consider whether this is in the public interest.

One alternative could be having a national authority for building control, taking the responsibility from town halls.

Architects and contractors:

The report criticised an architectural firm called Studio E, which was responsible for the design of the external walls and choice of materials.

The firm recommended using zinc rainscreen panels but eventually the deadly cladding materials were chosen largely on cost grounds.

The construction contractor Rydon also offered a saving due to its relationship with cladding sub-contractor Harley Facades.

Rydon “bears considerable responsibility for the fire”, the report said, while Harley “bears a significant degree of responsibility for the fire” after assuming others would check it was safe.

Fire brigade:

The London Fire Brigade was also criticised for not being adequately prepared to respond to a fast-spreading fire in a high-rise residential building, as the inquiry found it didn’t properly respond to the failures in the 2009 blaze at Lakanal House that killed six people.

The report said:

“The tragic conclusion is that the Lakanal House fire in July 2009 forewarned the LFB about the existence of the shortcomings which revealed themselves once more on the night of 14 June 2017.

“Those shortcomings could have been avoided if the London Fire Brigade had been more effectively led in a number of respects, particularly in its response to the Lakanal House fire, and if use had been made of its knowledge of the dangers flowing from modern materials and methods of construction.

“On any view, that is a serious indictment of an organisation whose principal purpose is to protect the public, and of the quality of its leadership.”

Given the failings from the fire service, the inquiry recommended setting up a College of Fire and Rescue to improve the training of firefighters and change how materials are tested for fire safety.

Potential prosecutions:

Police said they will scrutinise the inquiry’s conclusions before deciding on charges, which could include corporate or individual manslaughter, as well as fraud and health and safety offences. Prosecutions are unlikely before late 2026.

Stuart Cundy, deputy assistant commissioner of the Metropolitan police, said:

“To secure justice for those who died and all those affected by the fire we must examine the report – line by line – alongside the evidence from the criminal investigation.

“As I said previously, this will take us at least 12-18 months.

“This will lead to the strongest possible evidence being presented to the Crown Prosecution Service so it can make charging decisions.

“I can’t pretend to imagine the impact of such a long police investigation on the bereaved and survivors, but we have one chance to get our investigation right.”

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